The use of soft law in anti-corruption field
- Authors: KUZNETSOVA O.A.1
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Affiliations:
- Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice Lumumba
- Issue: Vol 7, No 4 (2023)
- Pages: 504-514
- Section: General Theory and History of Law and the State
- URL: https://bakhtiniada.ru/2587-9340/article/view/303622
- ID: 303622
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Abstract
The methods of combating transnational corruption, other than criminal law, are analyzed. These methods include the creation of informal networks of interaction between national anti-corruption agencies; participation in combatting corruption by non-state players such as the World Bank, the International Chamber of Commerce, and non-profit organizations such as Transparency International; the development by large international banks and development agencies of regimes for investigating and punishing companies that are involved in corrupt activities within the framework of projects they finance; implementation of Model Codes of Corporate Ethics and the functioning of compliance mechanisms in corporations. It is noted that these methods are especially beneficial at the international level, where there is no supranational sovereign, and the effectiveness of interstate cooperation remains limited. It is concluded that the creation of new mechanisms, including “soft law” mechanisms, makes it possible to develop more versatile and effective anti-corruption approaches. In particular, through the development of soft law mechanisms such as dialogue and face-saving, as well as the creation of regulatory networks, non-state organizations are able to control the activities of corporations. It is emphasized separately that such mechanisms are not a panacea, but they represent a valuable regulatory resource, which should be recognized by the international community.
About the authors
Olga A. KUZNETSOVA
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice Lumumba
Author for correspondence.
Email: o715575@mail.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1066-3783
PhD (Law), Associate Professor, Head of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure and Criminology Department, Law Institute
Russian Federation, 6 Miklukho-Maklaya St., Moscow, 117198, Russian FederationReferences
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