The Incentive-Targeting Problem in a Reflexive Game with a Point-Type Awareness Structure
- Authors: Petrov I.V1, Chkhartishvili A.G1
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Affiliations:
- Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences
- Issue: No 5 (2024)
- Pages: 42-48
- Section: Control in Social and Economic Systems
- URL: https://bakhtiniada.ru/1819-3161/article/view/286795
- ID: 286795
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Abstract
This paper considers a collective behavior model of agents under strategic uncertainty and incomplete awareness. Decision-making is modeled by a reflexive game in which participants choose their actions based on a hierarchy of beliefs about the game parameters, beliefs about beliefs, and so on. The study is focused on reflexive games with a point-type awareness structure and the linear best response of players. As shown below, the informational equilibrium in such games is analogous to the Nash equilibrium in a game on a network. Explicit expressions for the equilibrium responses of players are derived and conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibria are established. An incentive-targeting problem similar to that in a corresponding game on a network is formulated: a relationship is obtained between the equilibria in the game with common knowledge and the game with incomplete awareness in which the Principal individually reports new incentives to the players.
About the authors
I. V Petrov
Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences
Email: ivpetrov@ipu.ru
Moscow, Russia
A. G Chkhartishvili
Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences
Email: sandro_ch@mail.ru
Moscow, Russia
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