The Incentive-Targeting Problem in a Reflexive Game with a Point-Type Awareness Structure
- Autores: Petrov I.V1, Chkhartishvili A.G1
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Afiliações:
- Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences
- Edição: Nº 5 (2024)
- Páginas: 42-48
- Seção: Control in Social and Economic Systems
- URL: https://bakhtiniada.ru/1819-3161/article/view/286795
- ID: 286795
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Resumo
This paper considers a collective behavior model of agents under strategic uncertainty and incomplete awareness. Decision-making is modeled by a reflexive game in which participants choose their actions based on a hierarchy of beliefs about the game parameters, beliefs about beliefs, and so on. The study is focused on reflexive games with a point-type awareness structure and the linear best response of players. As shown below, the informational equilibrium in such games is analogous to the Nash equilibrium in a game on a network. Explicit expressions for the equilibrium responses of players are derived and conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibria are established. An incentive-targeting problem similar to that in a corresponding game on a network is formulated: a relationship is obtained between the equilibria in the game with common knowledge and the game with incomplete awareness in which the Principal individually reports new incentives to the players.
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Sobre autores
I. Petrov
Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences
Email: ivpetrov@ipu.ru
Moscow, Russia
A. Chkhartishvili
Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences
Email: sandro_ch@mail.ru
Moscow, Russia
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