Types of normative hierarchies: The principle of “lex superior” in R. Guastini’s approach to legal conflicts

One of the classic principles for resolving legal conflicts - “lex superior derogat legi inferiori” - presupposes the priority of norms derived from a legal act that holds greater legal force or occupies a higher position in the normative hierarchy. However, contemporary legal systems do not operate as straightforward vertical hierarchies, which necessitates further study into the ordering of such systems and the arguments supporting the validity of the norms within them. The purpose of the study is to analyze the approach of the Italian legal scholar Riccardo Guastini concerning four types of normative hierarchies he identifies. The article extensively presents arguments from Guastini’s “Lex Superior” (2013), originally published by the proponent of Genoese legal realism in French, to make them accessible to Russian-speaking researchers. According to R. Guastini, first, there is a formal hierarchy, which exists between norms that govern the creation of law and the laws produced in accordance with those norms. Second, a material hierarchy exists when contradictions between two norms are clearly prohibited by a third, higher-ranking norm. Third, there is a logical hierarchy, wherein one norm refers to another at a metalinguistic level. Finally, fourth, an axiological hierarchy depends on the value judgment of the interpreter, where one norm is considered superior based on interpretive assessments. The article also traces Guastini’s development of the concept of “metanorm”, which, he argues should be reserved exclusively for norms that explicitly reference other norms. Practical examples illustrating the application of these four types of normative hierarchies, in particular, such as the self-restraint exhibited by legislators and the revision processes within the Italian Constitution, are provided toward the end of the article. The study concludes by challenging the views that any hierarchy necessarily precedes interpretation and highlights the susceptibility of Guastini’s hierarchy types to manipulation when used to justify the validity of specific norms.