The article is devoted to the study of anti-corruption training for military specialists as a systemic element of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation. The subject of the research is a set of factors contributing to corruption-related offenses in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as mechanisms for their neutralization through educational and organizational measures. The analysis focuses on political, legal, socio-economic, and sociocultural aspects of corruption, including weak public oversight, imperfections in public procurement legislation, shadow economic practices, and entrenched traditions of “informal rewards.” Special attention is paid to the institutional specifics of the military environment, such as the closed nature of its structures, the principle of unitary command, and restrictions on the civil rights of military personnel, which create conditions for abuse. The author explores how these factors are interconnected and how they impact the army’s combat readiness, resource management efficiency, and public trust in state institutions. The relevance of the topic stems from the need to counter threats that corruption poses to the country’s defense sovereignty, particularly amid geopolitical instability and increased budget allocations for military needs. The study employs system analysis, legal-normative approaches, and case studies to identify structural drivers of corruption and assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in the military sphere. The scientific novelty of the research lies in its comprehensive analysis of corruption risks in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation through the lens of their institutional specificity. For the first time, the author integrates political, legal, and sociocultural factors into a unified model, revealing the pivotal role of the “informal rewards” tradition as a systemic catalyst for corruption. An original methodology for anti-corruption training is developed, combining interactive case studies and ethical behavior monitoring programs. It is established that the closed nature of military structures and the principle of unitary command not only increase risks of abuse but also hinder their detection, creating “transparency traps. Combating corruption in the military requires adapting anti-corruption measures to its institutional peculiarities. Sociocultural factors dominate over economic ones: low legal literacy and tolerance for petty corruption undermine the effectiveness of legislative prohibitions. Implementing interactive educational practices increases service members’ engagement in countering corruption. The results of the study provide a foundation for reforming military education systems and strengthening oversight of public procurement in the defense sector.