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## ADVANTAGES OF TRANSPECTIVE ANALYSIS IN HISTORICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH

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**Abstract.** In modern historical and psychological research, conducted in accordance with the post-non-classical methodology, it is necessary to shift the cognitive orientation points: from the directions, schools, research programs, concepts of a certain historical period in the development of psychological science to the ways of thinking and types of rationality implemented in it; from a monological, retrospective description of the processes of formation and transformation of the conceptual apparatus of a certain psychological school to a reflexive-dialogical reconstruction of the conceptual heritage of the relevant scientists in each case in the light of today and tomorrow in the development of psychology; from the usual thematic headings and sections of psychological knowledge to the areas of “overlapping” (metaphor of V.E. Klochko) of different types of scientific rationality, in the moving boundaries of which the processes of “rebirth of scientific tissue” (metaphor of L.S. Vygotsky) of psychology proceeded most actively and fruitfully; from known and accepted theories to concepts previously considered peripheral or even marginal, but containing an underestimated heuristic potential; from the traditions of adaptation of scientific explanatory schemes in psychology to the assimilation by psychology researchers of the philosophical and ideological heritage and of the descriptive potential of literature and art.

In order to compare the traditional and post-non-classical views of historical and psychological research, the author proposes the metaphors of “restoration” and “renaissance,” which illustrate different approaches to reconstructing historical forms of scientific thought: the preservation of the conceptual monuments of psychological science and the meaningful reconstruction of the conceptual heritage of psychology with a constructive revision of its heuristic potential.

The productivity of the application of transpective analysis (developed by V.E. Klochko) in historical and psychological research is justified because it allows: to build analytical bridges between conditionally closed scientific systems and schools; to understand the natural tendencies of complication of psychological knowledge, taking into account the competition and coexistence of types of scientific rationality; to identify the correspondence and complementarity of psychological concepts, between which there are significant temporal or paradigmatic distances; to model the dialog and confrontation of scientists who, for various reasons, did not belong to the same circle of referents or opponents.

**Keywords:** *History of psychology, psychological knowledge, post-non-classical psychology, methodological reflection, conceptual sphere, transpective analysis*

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In the modern history of psychology, the methodological problems of psychological science are interpreted in a concentrated form. Reconstruction of scientific systems, schools, and approaches involves not only revealed and consistent knowledge but also tacit knowledge that is not fully reflected and formalized in coherent theories and rigorous concepts. Historical and psychological analysis is often faced with the task of reconstructing and describing the unfinished conceptual apparatus in its formation and development, especially when it comes to the new and recent history of psychology. In describing moments of crisis (or “eternal symptoms” of a permanent methodological crisis) in the development of psychological science, the psychologist-historiographer is therefore forced to decide for himself the choice of methodological optics and meta-approaches from whose position the entire conceptual and factual landscape of the field that interests him or her is available for analytical investigation. “At the same time, it is impossible not to notice,” writes V.A. Mazilov, “that the problems characteristic of Russian psychology are manifested in the modern history of psychology. The main problem is the insufficient methodological elaboration of historical and psychological science and the unsolved number of important questions that have methodological aspects” [1, p. 91]. The problem of subject and method, characteristic of all psychology, is undoubtedly one of the most important methodological problems in the history of psychology. The researcher is inevitably faced with the following dilemma: the history of which psychology should he or she describe and systematize? Thus, E.E. Sokolova notes that the fundamental conflict between spiritualistic and physiological psychology in the struggle over their subject matter has not disappeared from the agenda of the contemporary development of psychological science: “... along with the periodic calls to “bring the soul back into psychology,” a seemingly directly opposing trend is intensifying to find a solution. Mechanisms of the psyche by studying neurons, neural networks, mapping the brain, which is an updated version of the same old idea about the psyche as a function of the brain” [2, p. 36].

At first glance, the methodological possibilities that the history of psychology has as an independent complex discipline are more than sufficient to solve most scientific and historiographical questions. T.D. Martsinkowska identifies four main research areas for forming psychological concepts with methodological tools peculiar to these areas [3]. The first, according to the author, “focuses on the study of the general patterns of the development of psychological science. Therefore, the leading research methods here are those introduced by M.G. Yaroshevsky of the concept of logic and the social situation of the development of science” [3, p. 75]. On the one hand, it is necessary to reveal the intrinsic logic of the development of psychological science (so to speak, the immanent, “objective” logic), on the other hand, to

reconstruct the social situation (socio-historical context, “spirit of the times”), which predetermined the change (and sometimes stagnation) of logical, psychological knowledge. The second research direction is “the formation of knowledge about the development of the psyche in the context of history and culture” [3, p. 75]. Here, the analytical focus is on the progress and cumulativeness of psychological knowledge in the context of a particular cultural paradigm. In the center of research interest of the third area of historical and psychological analysis “fall the regularities of the emergence and collapse of individual scientific schools and the features of the development of psychology within a particular school” [3, p. 76]. In this direction, T.D. Martsinkovskaya suggests using the methodological tools proposed by M.G. Yaroshevsky and the philosophers of science – K. Popper, I. Lakatos, and P. Feyerabend.

Among these tools that allow strengthening the analytical view of a psychologist-historiographer are: “the circle of opponents,” “scientific school,” “cognitive style,” “discourse,” “competition of ideas,” and “the concept of assumptions and refutations.” The fourth direction focuses on studying “the genesis of psychological knowledge about individual problems” [3, p. 76]. Within its framework, “the concepts of the circle of opponents and cognitive style are also used, as well as the idea of progress, which, however, is presented here more as an accumulation of knowledge” [3, p. 76]. In this historical and psychological research program, the emphasis is on the investigative version of reconstructing the processes of forming psychological concepts within cultural and historical contexts, paradigms, scientific schools, and disciplines. Discursive, polemical practices, competition/complementarity of scientific ideas and hypotheses are considered—however, T.D. Martsinkowska considers the process of formalization and development of scientific concepts cumulatively. The “figures” of historiographic reconstruction and analysis are regularly and constantly formed products (concepts, theories) of the intellectual activity of scientists. In this case, the ways and styles of thinking, personal knowledge, and epistemological attitudes of scientists remain “in the shadow” of the formation of the conceptual field of psychology.

The magnitude of the “eternal” problems of psychology requires the search for appropriate methodological optics, which would make it possible to direct and distribute the attention of research not only to individual local-temporal projections of a particular problem (and ways to its solution within a particular scientific school) but also to the process of transformation of the problem field itself. This process usually coincides with the process of changing scientific attitudes and rationality of scientists. Therefore, the research focus in the history of psychology sometimes has to be transferred from the directions, schools, research programs, and concepts of a particular historical period to the “fundamentally new way of thinking and the kind of rationality” that stood behind them and was implemented in them [4, p. 71], as well as to their dialog and confrontation with the forms of thinking traditional for that period.

The question of methodological elaboration for the history of psychology is very relevant, especially with regard to the determination of that methodological optics, which would be relevant to the scope of the problems

characteristic of psychology as a whole. In general, this is a question of the adequacy of the discipline of the history of psychology (and its methodological tools) for the problems of psychological science, which, as you know, is always broader and more mobile than the former. V.E. Klochko understood this very well when he justified the need to develop and include transpective analysis in the methodological toolkit of post-non-classical psychology: "Going beyond the established field that science has outlined at this stage of its development becomes inevitable when a problem field overlaps that field. The emergence of this "overlap" is due to the limitations of the explanatory schemes explained by the method that has determined the content and configuration of the subject field" [5, p. 99].

The solution to the question raised is to shift the focus of research attention from the usual thematic headings and sections of psychological knowledge to these "overlaps" within whose moving boundaries the process of "rebirth of the scientific fabric" (L.S. Vygotsky's metaphor) of psychology is most active and fruitful. However, in order to shift this analytical focus, it is necessary to understand methodology not as a set of predetermined principles and methods of cognition that supposedly exist independently of the researcher but as "a kind of rational-reflexive consciousness embodied in methodological analysis and aimed at investigating, improving, and constructing methods in various fields of spiritual and practical activity" [6, p. 535]. From this, the principle of conjugation of the methodological tools the researcher uses and the nature of his or her thinking becomes evident in the context and "force field" of which these tools become appropriate and effective organs of knowledge for the researcher.

The primacy of rational-reflexive consciousness and thought over the instrumental and normative components of methodological analysis allows us to view methodology from a different, anthropological angle: not as a set of principles and methods of cognition, but "as a self-reflexive ascent of the researcher to his or her own philosophical and methodological position" [7, p. 6]. Since methodology itself fulfills the function of a "reflexive mirror" and is a special form of "self-consciousness of science" [8], this requires special reflexive-analytical equipment and elaboration on the part of the researcher. "It can be assumed," writes V.M. Rozin, "that modern intellectual, scientific discourse presupposes a clear reflection on the features of thought within which it is constructed" [9, p. 149]. The researcher must know the theoretical value and the personal (implicit) foundations of scientific activity: "... by clarifying the formal structure of knowledge, the methodologist explains the substantive conditions for the meaningfulness of knowledge as a product of conscious activity" [7, p. 18]. Reconstruction of the movement of scientific thought, and the history of its formation, requires the researcher to explain and expand the methodological foundations and conditions for understanding these processes because the question of clarifying the conceptual origins of a particular theory sometimes finds its solution only in the context of the zone of the nearest or even extremely distant development of this theory.

The solution to the problem of reconstructing psychology and its individual fields of study requires the use of means of perception appropriate to: a) the discipline itself; b) the tendencies in scientific knowledge inherent in the current and immediate periods in the development of psychological science; c) the type of rationality from which it is studied; d) the methodological guidelines and standards from which the significance of the theory and event in the retrospective of psychological knowledge is judged. The definition of key and turning points in the development of scientific thought and the method of historiography are primarily determined by the methodological orientations peculiar to the researcher. This dependence has been described in great detail by I. Lakatos [10]. Thus, for the inductivist historian, only the judgments of his predecessors about “established facts” and generalizations derived by induction have historiographical value. Only such scientific discoveries receive due attention in his or her historiographical notes. They form the “backbone of the internal history of science” [10, p. 261]. In parallel, he or she will describe the history of pseudoscience and attempt to separate beliefs and ideas not based on solid empirical facts from genuine scientific discoveries. Conventional historians are more tolerant of speculative and false assumptions (no matter how fantastic they seem) if they have sufficient predictive power, conceptual coherence, and heuristic potential. Historians’ falsifiers are of value in reconstructing the development of scientific knowledge only if they posit theories that contradict the “basic claims” at a given point in time and predict the occurrence of such facts that are new and “unexpected from the standpoint of previous knowledge” [10, p. 269]. A historian who adheres to the methodology of research programs views the development of scientific thought through the prism of theoretical and empirical rivalry between the “main research programs” [10, p. 291] and points out the moments of scientific progress and regress that have accompanied this struggle.

In psychology, since its beginnings, as in any other science, “protracted” problems and epistemological leitmotifs have been preserved (subject areas in which the scientific fabric is constantly “born” and “reborn”). Their reconstruction and productive rethinking are possible through the application of the method of theoretical research, which allows recreating the logic of the emergence and transformation of scientific thought, its “pillars,” its “detours,” and the moments when they intersect. W. Reich once made an exact remark that coincides with our reflections: “The history of science is a long chain of continuations, developments, deviations from the beaten path and return to it, restoration of knowledge on a new basis, criticism of other views, new deviations from the pillar path and return to it, and creation of something different, new. It is a long, hard path” [11, p. 16]. If we adhere to such an understanding of the historical path of psychology as a science, then not only well-known theories inevitably come into the researcher’s field of vision, but also the so-called marginal theories that stand on the edge of scientific knowledge without adequate reflection. The analytical focus must not be on the declarative version of historical reconstruction, which is concerned with restoring the chronology of change in the scientific systems of the past and

establishing the continuity of scientific ideas and methods of cognition. The growth of knowledge in psychology was by no means always progressive in nature and rarely obeyed the cumulative principle: “The development of science, including psychology, is not a linear but a very complex process, on the path of which zigzag courses are possible, unrecognized discoveries, return to already existing solutions, stagnation, crises [12, p. 136]. Therefore, the focus should be on the reconstruction of the plan of rethinking [13] in order to reconsider the conceptual heritage of those scientists whose thinking was ahead of the times in the light of modern research trends and methodological tendencies in order to re-examine their prognostic and heuristic potential through methodological reflection: “The truly great among them were able to climb the escalator of their own thinking so high that, having been ahead of us, they are still above us today” [14, p. 23]. The main methodological reference point here is “a ‘conversation’ with psychologists and philosophers of the past...in which the contours of a new methodology are drawn” [7, p. 7]. Arming the researcher with such a reflexive lens allows non-obvious, implicit, peripheral, or even marginal concepts to become the focus of methodological analysis (as O.V. Lukyanov [15] has done), in which the contours of future psychology shine through, and post-non-classical rationality is embodied. The moments associated with the anthropological turns of psychological thought are particularly valuable for research within such a perspective view. Moments when classical psychology deviated from its pillar ways and, contrary to the prepared positive heuristics, rushed to grasp the whole human being and focused the search on subject areas of human scale.

The history of psychology in its modern version is not only and not so much about retrospective description and analysis of the theoretical and conceptual heritage of psychological science, about establishing the continuity and relatedness of scientific ideas, about reconstructing the “conceptual palette” of one or another historical period in the development of psychological thought. All this is necessary, of course, but apart from the need to understand the trends and prospects for the development of psychology and to reconsider this conceptual and theoretical heritage in the context of new methodological guidelines, there is a danger that it will become a very fruitless archiving of supposedly already existing and closed files of scientific knowledge. The history of psychology cannot be limited to digging up conceptual fossils and fixing and storing historical evidence of the multilinear process of formalization and transformation of psychology’s specialized knowledge, its categorical and conceptual apparatus. “In other words, in order to reconstruct the developmental tendencies of science, to identify the process of progressive growth of scientific knowledge, the rebirth of forms and styles of scientific thinking, the natural transformations of the scientific subject in the process of its self-development, there are not enough of the traditionally established means of historical and psychological knowledge” [5, p. 91]. This explains the necessity of the transpective analysis, which turns out to be almost the only method adequate to the dynamic processes accompanying psychological knowledge. To use a well-known literary metaphor, it is a kind of “*Mobilis in*

mobili” or moving in a moving thing dynamic analysis of open, self-evolving systems (to which psychological science itself belongs) is, according to the founder of transpective analysis, V.E. Klochko, one of the main tasks in the development of post-non-classical psychology: “Two key tasks of post-non-classical science, among which we include a dynamic analysis of the development of psychology through the prism of understanding it as a self-evolving scientific system and a theoretical (systemic) redefinition of the subject of science, are so far outside the methodological problems discussed in psychology” [16, p. 157].

If we take into account that some concepts only today receive the due understanding and fall into the long-awaited circle of opponents, then it is more correct to speak not of completed acts of cognition but of continuous scientific thinking (for example, the continuous thinking of L.S. Vygotsky or V.P. Zinchenko). Here it would be appropriate to contrast the metaphors of the Restoration and the Renaissance to highlight the essential differences between the traditional and the post-non-classical understanding of the history of psychology. In the first case, scientists are concerned with the restoration of “monuments” in strictly defined historical periods of the development of scientific thought with dates, with the establishment of a more or less strict chronological sequence of scientific ideas, and with the reconstruction of the intellectual situation of the time (*Zeitgeist*) to which these ideas corresponded. At the same time, the emphasis is on the analytically neutral reproduction of the scientific views and concepts of the past. This is a kind of attempt to realize the ideal of objective and impartial review and revision of psychological doctrines in their historical chronology. If there is any interpretation here, it bears the stamp of rigorous exegesis. In the second case, the emphasis is on the revival of scientific ideas, on the rereading of the works of scientists, especially those whose conceptual and heuristic potential becomes fully intelligible only from today and tomorrow in the development of psychology (its inherent trends). It seems that the obvious and established views of the scientists of the past are given a second life, become relevant and fresh again, and acquire a constructive-dialogical orientation. “To understand Vygotsky,” notes A.A. Bubbles, “is to make him a partner in thinking about the problems we face in our own work in the situation that is developing in modern psychology” [4, p. 84]. Here the effect of mutual reinforcement of viewpoints and methods of scientific thinking can occur: On the one hand, we strengthen our own theoretical and methodological foundations through unexpected rediscoveries of seemingly obvious ideas, and we “draw” new meanings from the texts of our predecessors, we create alienations (a term of V.B. Shklovsky) from the commonly understood conceptual clichés. On the other hand, we project our cognitive attitudes into these texts, giving them a new ideological and semantic potential based on the modern level of development of psychology and on those analytical connections that have become possible only from the standpoint of modern rationality. As a result, the ideological heritage of the scientist begins to acquire a new, non-trivial meaning (as if a completely new facet is found in the already seemingly familiar conceptual prism of their

theoretical constructions), and the one who conducts an invisible dialog with him, in his turn, performs a constructive decentering, overcomes his or her own analytical prejudices, expands his or her exploratory thinking with a new conceptual optics.

It is impossible to pin a scientist's thought (on the principle of assembling an entomological collection) unambiguously on a particular page of the calendar of the history of psychology and to set impenetrable limits to it. This closes the approaches to understanding the movement of scientific ideas, communication, and cross-fertilization processes. Thus, as a basis for building a philosophy of psychology (to which A.N. Leontiev once referred), V.A. Mazilov proposes "the concept of communicative methodology, focusing on the correlation of various psychological concepts" [1, p. 95]. Of course, the communication of scientists overcoming the temporal and conceptual framework is necessary, but only if, according to V.I. Kabrin, it is accompanied by overcoming the "fatal reduction" and the established "conventional templates in which traditional communication is trapped" [17, p. 17]. In order to realize the possibility of building such a fruitful transcommunicative methodology, unencumbered by conventional schemes and templates, it is necessary to go "beyond the method and methodology that provide us with saving procedures and certain interpretive schemes" [17, p. 17]. However, the inertia of the usual mini-paradigm logics and explanatory principles is such that implementing V.I. Kabrina's methodological hopes remains a challenging (and frightening for many researchers) task. According to V.E. Klochko, the conditions for its solution are complicated by the maintenance of the following tendency: "The tattered knowledge multiplies spontaneously, and the conceptual partitions erected by the local paradigms, on which the theories are based, are not permeable enough for constructive dialog" [16, p. 157].

Transspjective analysis as an essential methodological tool of systemic anthropological psychology makes it possible to see through these "conceptual partitions" the tendencies to complicate psychological knowledge and to enter into the ongoing dialog of scientists whose scientific views were in conceptual agreement. However, they held them at different historical times (were not contemporaries) or were contemporaries, but for various reasons, were not clear representatives of an opposing circle (as M.M. Bakhtin and L.S. Vygotsky or like A.A. Ukhtomsky and P.A. Florensky). Of particular interest and scientific value is the modeling of the possible communication of such psychological concepts between which there are considerable temporal or paradigmatic distances. V.S. Kubarev made one of the most productive attempts to implement this principle relatively recently [18].

The solution of such research problems is an example of the productive use of transspjective analysis as a method for modeling the timeless dialog of scientists, linking their explicit and implicit theoretical points of view and overcoming the usual mini-paradigm logics and explanatory schemes. It makes it possible to make completely new subject areas a figure of historical and psychological analysis: "the discovery of mechanisms for changing attitudes, 'prisms of seeing,' the identification of 'overlapping zones' in



interparadigmatic transitions, the origins of the emergence of new paradigmatic foundations in the space of established methodological principles and approaches” [5, p. 90].

The phenomenon of semantic resonance of value and worldview bases of psychological thinking, their coordination with the worldview of philosophers, representatives of literature, and art made it necessary to introduce a new concept into the methodological toolbox of the history of psychology – the “reference circle” [3]. Already V. Dilthey stated that “in the way great writers and poets approach human life, there is to be found abundant food and a task for psychology” [19, p. 29]. The enrichment of the conceptual apparatus of psychology did not infrequently occur in a “roundabout way” – by absorbing the philosophical and ideological heritage and potential of literature and art. The introduction of such a concept makes it possible to go beyond the monodisciplinary concept of the “opponent circle” and to include in a dialogical field the views of those scientists and artists “whose views, sometimes coming from a completely different field of knowledge, became a stimulus for the development of their own positions, new ideas in their field” [20, pp. 8–9]. Of particular interest is also the conceptual heritage of researchers who were ahead of their time, thinking not from their own concrete historical situation in the development of psychology but from the situation of tomorrow. “The foundations of transpective analysis were laid by those who, earlier than others, could go beyond the established schemes of understanding and explanation dictated by classical rationality” [5, p. 91]. We have already attempted to consider the conceptual heritage of the precursors of post-non-classical psychology (A.A. Ukhtomsky and P.A. Florensky) [21, 22].

The method of theoretical reconstruction, description, and critical analysis of scientific systems of the past with a pronounced emphasis on logic, the social situation of the development of science, and categorical analysis (A.N. Zhdan, T.D. Martsinkovskaya, M.G. Yaroshevsky) allow us to fully recreate the historical and epistemological situation of one or another historical stage in developing psychological thought. Thus, it is possible to imagine the historical path of psychology as a chain of discrete stages of its history (considering its temporal, paradigmatic boundaries). However, at the same time, this proves insufficiently effective in solving the problem of reconstructing the types of scientific thought in their constant complication, collision, and rebirth. Therefore, the main focus of historical and psychological research should be on the analysis of the process of formation of such theories that can consistently assimilate different ideals of rationality [5]. However, the realization of this research goal is possible only with a post-non-classical view of the history of psychology, which considers it “as a process of progressive complication of science understood as an open system” [5, p. 90]. Therefore, in order to understand how the central methodological problems of psychology, the problems of subject and method, were solved at each stage of the development of psychological knowledge, a perspective review and reconstruction of the transformational tendencies (processes) that took place at one or another stage of the development of psychology is required, including the reconstruction of

those “anomalies” (T. Kuhn) that persistently testified to the need to include phenomena related to human-sizedness in the subject matter of psychology.

In this respect, the Transspjective analysis is the optimal method of post-non-classical science. It allows directing the research focus on the processes and mechanisms of self-organization “in self-developing systems” on the dynamic moments of self-motion and self-development of these highly complex functional systems [16]. In this case, the method itself is compared with the subject of research (which is a rather rare case), which allows to capture the complex dynamics of formation and redefinition of the subject. The founder of this method, V.E. Klochko, described the advantages of this method: “As a dynamic, transspjective analysis, it is also temporal, taking into account the determination of the future; trendy, i.e., it identifies tendencies in the formation of open systems by considering them as gradients – directions in which possibilities gain strength to be implemented; prognostic, in that on this basis it is possible to make fairly reasonable predictions about the formation of the system; systemic, in that it takes into account the determination resulting from psychological (system-wide) neoplasms produced by the system in acts of interaction with the environment” [16, p. 163]. In terms of historical and psychological research, these aspects of transspjective analysis include: the filling of conceptual gaps in the dynamic picture of the complication of psychological knowledge; the identification of stylistic and ideological-semantic correspondences between the specific historical formations of the scientific thought of scientists that have determined the field of the current and immediate development of psychology; the identification of tendencies in the development of psychological thought that are still implicit, including those tendencies that go beyond the established paradigms and are perceived as anomalous processes of knowledge transformation; an assessment of the theoretical significance and heuristic value of the conceptual heritage of psychology (in the form of individual schools and representatives of psychology), starting from the constructive role it has played not so much in its historical time but in the distant future; the consideration of the determinism of psychological knowledge through moments of polemical and synergistic interaction of carriers of academic and practical knowledge (including the identification of moments of complication of scientific and psychotechnical thought).

The essence of transspjective analysis is not reduced to a retrospective description of the scientific systems of the past but is revealed in the researcher’s ability to fix the moments of the interpenetration of realized, ongoing, and emerging knowledge. In the case of the history of psychology, “...the part of historical analysis necessarily includes not only the “past,” but also the present and the future, and is primarily fixed in relation to a particular action (which is also subject to some reconstruction) – organized in the present situation in view of the underlying goals in the future” [4, p. 81]. The part of historical-psychological analysis endowed with a perspective view is not a specific historical concept (as, e.g., the concept of thinking Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow), but such a concept, in the semantic content of which are

contained the processes and results of interpenetration of various historical forms and conceptions of the problem field of the psychology of thinking, including those whose conceptual contours are just maturing in the living, conceptually incomplete discourse of researchers, dictated by the tasks of the psychology of thinking of tomorrow.

To summarize the original outcome of this paper, we turn once again to the key concept whose meaningful disclosure sets a post-non-classical milestone in the planning and conduct of historical and psychological research. Transsperspective, according to V.E. Klochko, “is not retrospective (a view from the present into the past), not perspective (the design of the future from the present). It is such a view, thanks to which each point on the way of human development (the steady progress of becoming human) is understood as a place of coexistence of times, their interpenetration, and mutual transition, where the tendency to complication of a human as a systemic organization is realized. Each of these places is interesting because it is located in the habitat of particular people who lived in different epochs” [23, p. 12]. By applying the transsperspective analysis, we get the opportunity to discover certain places of convergence and interpenetration of styles of scientific thought of conceptual fields: a historical perspective pervades the scientist, whether he wants to admit it or not, in the “fabric of scientific knowledge” (L.S. Vygotsky): he writes himself, but his hand is guided by those who were before him, and to no less extent by those who will be after him. ...“ [16, p. 159]. In other words, a researcher conducting a transsperspective analysis must make the temporal counterpoints of evolving and increasingly complex scientific thought (including his own thought) the object of his methodological considerations in order to find points of attraction for consonant, complementary ideas that have been either realized, then forgotten, and then recognized again by scientists as conceptual guidelines for the positive heuristics of a particular psychological theory. Solving such a problem requires a completely different understanding of the logic of the development of scientific knowledge. The cumulative-progressive growth of the conceptual sphere of psychology and the linear progress of scientific and psychological thought are the components of an epistemological myth that is convenient for scientists and characterizes their cognitive attitudes to a greater extent than the actual process of psychological knowledge transformation.

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## **ПРЕИМУЩЕСТВА ПРИМЕНЕНИЯ ТРАНССПЕКТИВНОГО АНАЛИЗА В ИСТОРИКО-ПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯХ**

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**Аннотация.** В современных историко-психологических исследованиях, проводимых в русле постнеклассической методологии, назревает необходимость перемещения познавательных ориентиров: с направлений, школ, исследовательских программ, концепций определенного исторического периода развития психологической науки на реализуемые в них способы мышления и типы рациональности; с монологического, ретроспективного описания процессов оформления и трансформации концептуального аппарата той или иной психологической школы на рефлексивно-диалогическую реконструкцию концептуального наследия вечно актуальных ученых, в свете сегодняшнего и завтрашнего дня развития психологии; с привычных тематических рубрик и разделов психологического знания на области «перекрытия» (метафора В.Е. Ключко) разных типов научной рациональности, в подвижных границах которых наиболее активно и плодотворно шли процессы «перерождения научной ткани» (метафора Л.С. Выготского) психологии; с общеизвестных и признанных теорий на концепции, признававшиеся ранее периферийными или даже маргинальными, но содержащими недооцененный эвристический потенциал; с традиций адаптации в психологии естественнонаучных объяснительных схем на ассимиляцию учеными-психологами философско-мировоззренческого наследия и описательного потенциала литературы и искусства.

С целью сопоставления традиционного и постнеклассического взгляда на историко-психологическое исследование автором предлагаются метафоры «реставрации» и «ренессанса», которые иллюстрируют разные подходы к реконструкции исторических форм научной мысли: сохранение концептуальных «памятников» психологической науки и осмысляющее воссоздание концептуального наследия психологии с конструктивным пересмотром его эвристического потенциала.

Обосновывается продуктивность применения транспективного анализа (разработанного В.Е. Ключко) в историко-психологическом исследовании, поскольку он позволяет: наводить аналитические мосты между условно закрытыми научными системами и школами; понимать закономерные тенденции усложнения психологического познания с учетом конкуренции и сосуществования типов научной рациональности; выявлять соответствие и комплементарность психологических концепций, между которыми существуют значительные временные или парадигмальные «расстояния»; моделировать диалог и конфронтацию ученых, которые в силу разных причин не входили в один референтный или оппонентный круг.

**Ключевые слова:** *история психологии, психологическое знание, постнеклассическая психология, методологическая рефлексия, концептосфера, транспективный анализ*

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